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This paper uses the gravity model of trade to investigate the link between foreign aid and 
exports in recipient countries. Most of the theoretical work emphasizes the negative impact of 
aid on recipient countries’ exports primarily due to exchange rate appreciation, disregarding 
possible positive effects of aid in promoting bilateral trade relations. The empirical findings, 
in contrast, indicate that the net impact of aid on recipient countries’ exports is positive -even 
though the macroeconomic impact of aid is rather small- and that the average return for 
recipients’ exports is about 1.50 US$ for every aid dollar spent. We argue that “bilateral 
aid” seems to promote good bilateral trade relations, mutual trust and familiarity and that 
those factors reinforce bilateral trade, including recipient country exports. The paper also 
estimates the effect of different types of aid (bilateral aid versus multilateral aid flowing to a 
specific recipient) and studies aid’s contribution to an expansion of exports in different 
regions of the world.  It is found that aid is strongly export-enhancing in Asia and Latin 
America, but not in Africa. 
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1. Introduction 
Both the Doha Development Round and the UN declaration on the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) emphasize the importance of trade development in developing countries 
(DCs), especially in the least developed countries (LDCs). In specific, Millennium 
Development Goal 8 (MDG8: “Develop a global partnership for development”) is concerned 
with a far better participation of developing countries in international trade through improved 
access to developed countries’ markets and an active improvement of production and export 
capabilities in developing countries by means of official development assistance (ODA), 
especially Aid for Trade (AfT) measures.
1 In this context, foreign aid is seen as a means to 
alleviate the lack of net capital inflows to least developed countries (LCDs) and to overcome 
severe supply-side constraints (physical and social infrastructure, insufficient capabilities in 
agriculture, manufacturing and services).  
Since trade liberalization talks in the Doha Development Round ask for mutual 
concessions, on the side of developing countries concessions to liberalize their imports 
depend on an expected benefit, such as an increase of their exports. It is therefore of utmost 
importance to study the impact of aid
2 on developing countries’ exports to see whether aid is  
indeed an appropriate means to promote the production of export goods and thus enhance an 
export-led development which in turn could decrease aid-dependency of developing 
countries.
3 Also donors are more and more interested in aid effectiveness having agreed on an 
                                                           
1 Aid for trade is part of ODA (about 20 percent) and includes 1) technical trade assistance, 2) trade-related 
infrastructure and 3) capacity-building to improve production and export capacities. The idea of giving AfT 
dates back to the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) and  has become an interesting feature of world trade rounds, 
especially since the Sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in 2005. The original motivation was to grant 
AfT in return for the trade concessions made in trade liberalization agreements. 
2 In particular bilateral aid. 
3 As we will show in the theoretical part of the study (Section 2), capital inflows in the form of development aid 
may have positive and negative effects on recipient countries’ exports and it is up to empirical investigations to 
determine which of the effects prevails.  
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increase of their aid-to-GDP ratio to 0.7 percent by 2015, which would imply for donors like 
Germany a doubling of the current ratio.  
 
In previous and related current work, it has been investigated whether aid promotes 
donor country exports to the recipient country (Martinez-Zarzoso et al. 2009; Nowak-
Lehmann et al. 2009, Johansson and Pettersson, 2009; Martinez-Zarzoso et al. 2010). A rather 
robust export-enhancing effect of bilateral aid was indeed found for donor countries. This 
could be a one-sided benefit to the donors, or actually promote overall bilateral trade between 
donors and recipients, including promoting exports from recipient countries. If this latter 
effect existed, this would imply a more positive assessment of bilateral aid.  
 
In this paper, we will rely on a bilateral trade model as we focus on bilateral trade 
relations between donors and recipient countries and, in particular, on aid’s impact on reci-
pient countries’ exports. We will utilize an augmented gravity model with the usual control 
variables (Bergstrand, 1985, 1989 and 1990; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Nelson and 
Juhasz Silva, 2008; Johansson and Pettersson, 2009), adding the bilateral exchange rate to 
control for changes in competitiveness between trading partners. Having a bilateral trade 
model our focus is on the impact of bilateral aid (from one or several sources to a specific 
recipient) as compared to multilateral aid on recipient countries’ exports. The reasons why we 
think bilateral aid should be strongly related to bilateral trade are twofold: bilateral aid not 
only enhances bilateral trade through reputation, mutual trust and support,  goodwill and 
familiarity between trading partners of the North and the South (Arvin and Baum, 1997; 
Arvin and Choudry, 1997; Johansson and Pettersson, 2009), but also through more visible   4
things such as the creation of customer relations, distribution channels and a better adaptation 
to the formal and informal market environment (Johansson and Pettersson, 2009).
4 
We add to the existing literature by elaborating on a new aspect, namely the 
importance of bilateral trade relations for trade performance. In particular we ask whether 
different kinds of aid (distinguished by the importance of bilateral aid relations)  have a 
different impact on recipient exports to donor countries. We consider three different types of 
aid: first, bilateral aid of a single donor-recipient pair with a supposedly very high positive 
impact on bilateral trade relations, second, bilateral aid of the rest of the donors to a single 
recipient with a possibly disturbing (negative) impact on an existing bilateral trade relation, 
and third, multilateral aid to a single recipient with supposedly no impact on existing bilateral 
trade relations. In contrast to studies by Clemens et al. (2004), Reddy and Minoiu (2006), 
Johansson and Pettersson (2009) and Minoiu and Reddy (2010), who look at economically 
different types of aid (development aid versus non-development aid, technical assistance, aid 
for trade etc.), we stick to aggregated aid. We find justification for doing so in a study by 
Rajan and Subramanian (2008) and Johansson and Pettersson (2009) who actually do not find 
larger (aid-elasticity) coefficients for development aid, technical assistance or aid for trade 
than for aggregated aid.  The fungibility of aid is another reason why we think aid is not really 
project-or program-specific and therefore we will not be able to gain new insights by studying 
disaggregated aid (Morrissey, 2006).     
Besides, we distinguish between different impacts of aid and its covariates in the short 
and in the long run. In particular, we find that aid is exogenous in the short term but 
endogenous in the long term. In long time horizons aid and recipient countries’ exports are 
inter-linked (bi-directional relation between aid and exports) implying that either more aid is 
given to countries with a poor export performance because donors want to promote 
                                                           
4 Johansson and Pettersson (2009) argue that an intensified aid relation works to reduce the effective cost of 
geographic distance thus reducing the ‘distance’-coefficient, whereas we argue that an intensified aid relation 
makes aid more efficient thus increasing the ‘bilateral aid’-coefficient.  
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development in recipient countries or that more aid is given to successful exporters because 
donors wish to reward  recipient countries’ export efforts of the past. The short-run model 
used is an autoregressive distributed lag ADL (2,2) model that is estimated with FGLS 
(Feasible Generalized Least Squares) and no instruments are utilized for aid after a  Granger 
causality test had established the exogeneity of aid in the short term. As to the long-run 
model, we apply improved long-run panel estimation techniques (Dynamic Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (DFGLS)) that allow us to take the time series properties of the 
series into account and to control for endogeneity of the regressors, heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation
5 so that consistent and efficient results can be generated. Especially the 
control for endogeneity that was either  IV –based or based on lags (GMM) in the past was 
not without weaknesses in the presence of bad instruments or in the presence of 
autocorrelation of the disturbances.  
In our model, an important underlying assumption concerning bilateral trade relations 
is that developing countries’ exports to industrialized countries might be more advantageous 
than exports to equally developing countries and therefore deserve special support and 
attention. The benefit from exporting to industrialized countries’ markets is said to be due to 
an enhanced learning from exporting to those markets. Positive effects from exporting are 
related to knowledge spillovers, improvements of product quality, management, marketing 
and transport capabilities etc. A further advantage from exporting to markets of industrialized 
countries are productivity increases through enhanced competition, economies of scale 
through a conquest of well-funded donor markets and eventually the alleviation of the capital 
and the foreign exchange constraint.  Similar to our approach to the effect of aid on donor 
country exports (Martinez-Zarzoso et al. 2010), we will also study whether aid only promotes 
trade with the donor at the expense of trade of other countries, or whether it promotes overall 
trade.   
                                                           
5 Through control of autocorrelation of the error terms the omitted variable bias is also attenuated.   6
Applying the augmented gravity model, we find that the increase in recipients’ exports 
induced by donors’ direct bilateral aid of the first type is quite noticeable. We observe an 
increase in exports of about US$ 1.50 for every aid dollar received in the overall sample of 
130 recipient countries. This is actually slightly larger than the effect of aid on donor country 
exports to the recipient, so that the impact of aid on bilateral aid on trade is actually slightly 
larger for the recipient than for the donors.  Aid’s average impact on recipient countries is 
around US$ 3.00 per $ of aid in Asia and Latin America, but only US$ 0.16 in Africa. In Sub-
Saharan Africa the impact of aid is even insignificant. Interestingly, the evidence indicates 
that the positive impact of bilateral aid takes time to evolve and to become visible, whereas 
the impact of multilateral aid is minute (around zero), but negative. This could be an 
indication that multilateral aid does not strengthen trade links between the North and the 
South. We furthermore find that the exchange rate does not play a role in affecting exports in 
the long term, whereas it does play a role in the short to medium term.  
We find the average impact of foreign aid remarkable, given that aid has a very weak 
impact on macroeconomic outcome variables. Aid impacts weakly, but positively on 
investment, negatively on domestic savings (crowding out effect) and negatively on the real 
exchange rate (appreciation of the real exchange rate). This suggests that aid seems to 
promote exports mainly through improved bilateral trade relations.   
 
Section 2 summarizes the transmission channels related to the aid-export link. Section 
3 presents a description of the data. Section 4 explains the model specification and discusses 
the main results. Section 5 presents a number of robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 outlines 
some conclusions.   7
 
2. The aid-export link: the conceptual framework 
2.1 The augmented gravity model of trade 
Solid theoretical foundations that provide a consistent base for an empirical analysis of 
bilateral trade relations have been developed in the past three decades by Anderson (1979), 
Bergstrand (1985, 1989 and 1990), Helpman (1987), Deardorff (1998), Feenstra et al. (2001), 
Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003, Feenstra (2004), Haveman and Hummels (2004) and 
Redding and Venables (2004). They are based on the gravity model of trade, which enables 
the evaluation and quantification of the impact on exports of a variety of factors related to 
trade frictions. Anderson and van Wincoop (AvW) contributed to this literature by an   
appropriate modelling of trade costs. The AvW model has been recently extended to 
applications explicitly involving developed and less developed countries by Nelson and 
Juhasz Silva (2008). They present an extension of AvW to the asymmetric north-south case 
and derive some implications related to the effect of aid on trade.  
 
According to the underlying theory of the gravity model, trade between two countries 
is explained by nominal incomes and the populations of the trading countries, by the distance 
between the economic centers of the exporter and importer, and by a number of trade 
impediment and facilitation variables. Dummy variables such as former colony, common 
language, and common border are generally used to proxy for these factors. The gravity 
model has been widely used to investigate the role played by specific policy or geographical 
variables in explaining bilateral trade flows. Consistent with this approach and in order to 
investigate the effect of development aid on recipient countries’ exports, we augment the 
traditional model with bilateral exchange rates, bilateral aid (ODA), from a specific donor and 
the rest of the donors to a recipient country and with imputed multilateral aid. The augmented 
gravity model is specified as   8
ijt ij ijt ijt jt ijt ij jt it jt it ijt u F XCHR MAID BAIDI BAID DIST YHR YHD YR YD X 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
0
           
             
(1)                        
 
where t stands for year. Xijt are the exports to donor i from recipient j in period t in current 
US$;  YDi (YRj) indicates the GDPs
6 of the donor (recipient), YHDi (YHRj) are donor 
(recipient) GDPs per capita and DISTij is the geographical distance between countries i and j. 
BAID ij is bilateral net official development aid from donor i to country j in current US$ and 
one has to be aware that it could also be an indicator of bilateral trade relations. BAIDIj is 
bilateral net ODA from all the other donors (excluding i) to recipient j and MAIDij is imputed 
multilateral development aid from donor i to country j in current US$. The rational of adding 
the latter two variables is to control for cross-correlation effects due to the fact that other 
donors’ aid could promote their own imports from recipient j and may have a negative effect 
on recipient country’s j exports/donor’s i imports.  XCHRijt denotes nominal bilateral 
exchange rates
7 in units of local currency of country i (donor) per unit of currency in country j 
(recipient) in year t (indexed so that XCHR=100 in base year 2000). Finally, Fij denotes other 
factors impeding or facilitating trade (e.g., former colony, common language, or a common 
border). 
In Equation 2 time and country-by-country fixed effects are incorporated.  Taking 
logarithms the basic specification of the gravity model is 
ijt ij dummies ijt LXCHR ijt LMAID jt LBAIDI ijt LBAID
ij LDIST jt LYHR it LYHD jt LYR it LYD ij t ijt LX
     
       
     
       
'
9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0
                           ( 2 )  
where:  
                                                           
6 We utilize GDP and not GNP in order to avoid a double-counting of income received by third countries 
(international transfer payments, such as aid). 
7 When the gravity model is estimated using panel data it is recommended to add bilateral exchange rates also as 
a control variable (Carrère, 2006).   9
L denotes variables in natural logs.  t   are specific time effects that control for omitted 
variables common to all trade flows but which vary over time. ij   are trading-partner fixed 
effects that proxy for multilateral resistance factors. When these effects are included, the 
influence of the variables that are time invariant cannot be directly estimated. This would be 
the case for distance in a fixed effects model of bilateral trade. 
The model will be estimated for data on 21 donor and 130 recipient countries during 
the period from 1988 to 2007.  
 
2.2 Transmission channels from aid to bilateral exports   
While it is possible to study the “prima facie” impact of foreign aid on exports by means of 
export equations based on an augmented gravity model (treating aid as an income transfer or 
as a temporary increase in income), it is not possible to identify the transmission channels 
from development aid to bilateral exports within this framework.  
 
First of all there might be an unquantifiable/unobservable transmission channel. If aid 
is strongly correlated with unquantifiable and/or unobservable variables such as improved 
trade relations (through mutual trust and support, familiarity and goodwill), it is statistically 
/econometrically impossible to separate these effects from the effect of the aid variable. In this 
case, the transmission channel between bilateral aid and bilateral exports would be that aid 
promotes “bilateral trade relations” and we would expect that in this case aid not only   
promotes donor country exports, but also recipient countries’ exports. If we include only 
bilateral aid (LBAID) into the model (eq. 3), assuming bilateral exports (LXijt ) to be only a 
function of bilateral aid (LBAIDijt) and some standard controls) 
ijt k control k control ijt LBAID ij t ijt LX                ... 1 1 0                                      (3) 
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but not bilateral trade relations (LBTR), which are highly correlated with bilateral aid, then the 
 coefficient measures the composite impact of both bilateral aid and bilateral aid relations 
( 2 1      ) and will therefore have an upward bias.  
However, even if we had data on bilateral trade relations, the true model (eq. 4) below 
could not be estimated due to the strong correlation between LBAID and LBTR. 
ijt k control k control ijt LBTR ijt LBAID ij t ijt LX                  ... 1 1 2 1 0            (4) 
 
Besides, there are macroeconomic transmission channels. The gravity framework 
catches the supply-side effect of aid resulting in an income effect and later in a production and 
export effect. Its demand-side effect (Dutch disease effect) is reflected in the exchange rate, 
which enters the gravity model as a control variable. The exchange rate effect of aid being 
incorporated into the exchange rate-vector cannot be disentangled from the overall exchange 
rate effect. To learn more about the indirect impact of development aid, we will therefore 
briefly describe its macroeconomic transmission channels. 
 
2.3 Transmission channels from aid to exports (to the world) 
More recent studies on the income effect of aid (i.e. the overall macroeconomic impact of aid, 
as measured by the impact of aid on the level of per capita income or growth) have shown  the 
impact of aid on economic development to be  statistically insignificant (Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2008; Nowak-Lehmann D. et al., 2009; Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2005, 2008 
and 2010). The main arguments used are: (1)  lack of a cointegrating relationship between aid 
and growth (Nowak-Lehmann D. et al.), (2) the statistical insignificance of the aid-growth 
relationship when looking at hundreds of studies by way of a meta analysis (Doucouliagos 
and Paldam) or (3) the missing robustness and insignificance of the aid–growth coefficients 
when running regressions over different samples, different time horizons, different time   11
periods and utilizing different types of aid (Rajan and Subramanian). In addition, the study of 
Nowak-Lehmann D. et al. even argues that  development aid and the level of per capita 
income are not sufficiently related in the long run. This is said to be due to an unstable 
cointegrating relationship.
8  
As for the specific macroeconomic channels at work, we can think of aid as having an 
investment- and a savings-effect. Part of the aid transfer will be consumed and part of it will 
be saved and invested. In the medium to long term we therefore expect a supply-side impact 
of aid-financed public expenditure. Public investment in infrastructure generates productivity 
spillovers and can also provide for a learning-by-doing externality (Adam and Bevan, 2006).  
The investment effect which is derived from a multiplicative model can be tested as 
follows: 
jt jt jt jt jt LAIDY LEXTNSY LDYS LINVY           3 2 1 j                            (5)
       
where all variables are in logs. j stands for recipient country j and t stands for time.  jt INVY  is 
the investment-to-GDP ratio in recipient country j at time t.  DSY is the domestic savings-to-
GDP ratio, EXTSNY is net external savings (minus aid) -to- GDP and  AIDY is the net aid-to-
GDP ratio. 
The impact of foreign aid on domestic savings can be tested by means of the following 
equation: 
jt jt jt j jt LAIDY LEXTSNY LDSY         2 1                                      (6) 
Note that the impact on total savings-to-GDP is 
jt jt jt jt DSY EXTSNY AIDY TSY        . 
                                                           
8 Different cointegration tests (Kao’s, Pedroni’s and Johansen’s) came to different conclusions. The Pedroni-test 
rejected the existence of a cointegrating relationship, whereas the Kao and the Johansen-based tests found one or 
several cointegrating vectors.   12
As for the third macroeconomic channel, monetary trade theory emphasizes the anti-
export bias (Dutch disease effect) stemming from net capital inflows in general and from 
development aid in specific (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005). This anti-export bias is caused 
by an appreciation of the real exchange rate (LXCHR) and is considered as a demand-side 
effect that arises in the short run (Adam and Bevan, 2006). In a fixed exchange rate system 
the real appreciation results from an increase of the monetary base, the money supply and 
eventually an increase in the prices of non-tradables (price of tradables remain unaltered in 
the small country case). In a flexible exchange rate system the real appreciation of the 
exchange rate results from the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate due to capital 
inflows in the form of foreign aid. The real appreciation of the exchange rate hurts the 
producers of export and import substitution goods, but makes the production of non-tradables 
more profitable. Therefore in the medium to long run, resources will flow into the non-
tradable sector and this sector will expand. As imports become cheaper, imports will rise 
which will lead to trade deficits thus causing a pro-import bias. Spending development aid on 
imports (preferably on capital goods and intermediates) will partly reverse this appreciation 
effect. The effect of development aid on the real economy therefore depends on the amount of 
development aid (capital inflow) and the share that is spent on tradables (imports) and non-
tradables (transport, construction, telecommunication, energy). It has to be kept in mind 
though that a clever exchange rate management in the recipient country can crucially 
influence the real exchange rate. 
The effect of net capital flows on the real exchange rate can be modelled as follows:  
jt jt jt j jt LAIDY LEXTNSY LXCHR         2 1                                                                  (7) 
 
2.4 Existing empirical findings on the aid-export link (the non-bilateral approach) 
Studies on an aid-export link for recipient countries are very scarce. The export measure in 
those studies is not bilateral exports, but exports of a recipient country j to the world. Studies   13
with the export-to-GDP ratio as dependent variable and the aid-to-GDP ratio and covariates as 
explanatory variables (Munemo et al., 2007; Kang et al., 2010) reveal mixed empirical 
findings.  
Munemo and his co-authors apply FE-IV estimation techniques to a sample of 84 
developing countries (unbalanced panel) and find a positive and significant relationship 
between aid and exports. They find a non-linear effect (diminishing returns) of aid in the 
period 1980-2003. However, in a sample of 72 recipient countries (balanced panel) this 
relationship becomes statistically insignificant. Running regressions on the LDCs (32 
countries) they find a positive and significant but linear relationship, and for low income 
African economies (33 countries) the relationship is significant, positive but non-linear. 
Khan and co-authors present results for 30 recipient countries utilizing data for the 
period 1966-2002. Applying the heterogenous panel vector-autoregression, they find a 
positive relationship between aid and exports for 13 countries and a negative relationship for 
17 countries. 
When studying the relationship between exports to the world-to-GDP ratio and aid-to-
GDP ratio, the authors observe on average a negative relationship in a sample of 28 countries 
in the period 1979-2004. This relationship is linear and significant. These results are based on 
a fixed effects model and dynamic OLS estimation controlling for endogeneity and serial 
correlation of the disturbances (DFGLS). 
 
3. Description of the data sources and the data on aid  
3.1 Data sources 
Official Development Aid data are from the OECD Development Database on Aid from DAC 
Members. We consider net ODA disbursements in current US$
9, instead of aid commitments, 
because we are interested in the funds actually released to the recipient countries in a given 
                                                           
9 The gross amount comprises total grants and loans extended (according to DAC).   14
year. Disbursements record the actual international transfer of financial resources, or the 
transfer of goods or services valued at the cost to the donor.  
The original member countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Bilateral exports are obtained from the OECD online database (International Trade and 
Balance of Payments Statistics). Data on income and population variables are drawn from the 
World Bank (World Development Indicators Database, 2009). Bilateral exchange rates are 
from the IMF statistics which have been corrected for the introduction of the euro and 
currency reforms in the recipient countries
10. Distances between capitals have been computed 
as great-circle distances using data on straight-line distances in kilometres, latitudes and 
longitudes. They are from the CIA World Fact Book. Trade impeding or promoting factors 
such as being a former colony, sharing a common language or a common border are taken 
from the CEPII data base (http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/fdi.htm). 
 
3.2 Net ODA, our measure of aid 
The aid given by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members is reported as 
official development aid (ODA) and other official flows (OOF). OOF are other official sector 
transactions which do not meet ODA criteria
11 and are therefore disregarded in our analysis.  
The aid data contains the bilateral transactions as well the multilateral contributions. The 
former are undertaken by a donor country directly with an aid recipient and the latter are 
                                                           
10 The IFS and WDI statistics are not adjusted for currency reforms and therefore very problematic. The data had 
to be corrected by the authors. 
11 For example, grants to aid recipients for representational or essentially commercial purposes, official bilateral 
transactions intended to promote development but having a grant element of less than 25 per cent or official 
bilateral transactions, whatever their grant element, that are primarily export-facilitating in purpose ("official 
direct export credits").  Net acquisitions by governments and central monetary institutions of securities issued by 
multilateral development banks at market terms, subsidies (grants) to the private sector to soften its credits to aid 
recipients, funds in support of private investment are also classified as OOF. 
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contributions of international agencies and organizations. The recipients include not only 
countries and territories but also multilateral organizations that are also ODA eligible. 
The total net ODA disbursements, the aid data we will work with, are the sum of 
grants, capital subscriptions, total net loans and other long-term capital. The grants include 
debt forgiveness and interest subsidies in associated financing packages. The capital 
subscriptions to multilateral organizations are made in the form of notes and similar 
instruments unconditionally convertible at sight by the recipient institutions. Loans and other 
long-term capital include the total disbursements of ODA loans and equity investment. Total 
net loans and other long term capital represent the loans extended minus repayment received 
and offsetting entries for debt relief. Technical co-operation, development food aid and the 
emergency aid are included in grants and gross loans. 
Figure 1 shows the five largest recipients of net ODA in the 1980-2007 period. Iraq is 
the largest recipient followed by Egypt, China and Indonesia. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 2 shows that net ODA disbursement have been quite volatile over the 1988-
2007 period. The signing of the UN-Declaration of the Millennium Development goals in 
2000 will certainly help to push up net ODA disbursements in the future. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 3 illustrates that countries involved in conflicts or civil wars (Congo, Rwanda, 
Mozambique, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan) or countries plagued by 
natural disasters (Nicaragua) received huge amounts of ODA in the 1988-2007 period. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
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3.3 Our aid variables entering the model 
We will concentrate on net ODA and within this category on three types of aid: First, bilateral 
net ODA (aid) of a donor i to a recipient country j (BAID), second, the sum of bilateral aid 
given by all donors (except i) to j (BAIDI) and third, multilateral aid (MAID) given by donor i 
to developing country j  (which is the share country j receives approximately through a 
multilateral institution that is fuelled by donor country i; the donor remains unknown to the 
recipient and vice versa). 
 
 
The idea of utilizing BAID, BAIDI and MAID is the following: With BAID we aim at 
measuring also the importance of bilateral trade relations between country pairs ij, with 
BAIDI we wish to check whether other donors disturb an existing bilateral trade relation 
between ij and with MAID we wish to find a proxy for the efficiency of aid in the absence of 
bilateral trade relations.  
Multilateral aid (in the sense of multilateral contributions of international agencies and 
organizations (also part of ODA)) can be imputed back to the funders of those bodies. The 
OECD uses a specific methodology that we briefly explain. The approach will vary depending 
on whether the intention is to show the share of the receipts of a given recipient attributable to 
a particular donor, or the share of a given donor’s outflows that can be assigned to an 
individual recipient. As DAC statistics are primarily designed to measure donor effort, the 
second approach is the one taken in DAC statistical presentations. First, the percentage of 
each multilateral agency’s total annual gross disbursements that each recipient country 
receives is calculated. This calculation is carried out only in respect of agencies’ 
disbursements of grants or concessional (ODA) loans from core resources. Then, the recipient 
percentages derived in the first step are multiplied by a donor's contribution in the same year 
to the core resources of the agency concerned to arrive at the imputed flow from that donor to   17
each recipient. 
12  This calculation is repeated for each multilateral agency. The results from 
the second step for all agencies are summed to obtain the total imputed multilateral aid from 
each donor to each recipient country.   
 
4. Model specifications, estimations  and main results 
4.1 The long-run and the short-run (dynamic) model 
In a first step, the model is estimated as a long-run model (eq. 8) following the dynamic OLS 
procedure (DOLS) proposed by Stock and Watson (1993) controlling for endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables. As we also control for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of the 
error terms, we eventually estimate the model by means of panel dynamic feasible generalized 
least squares (DFGLS). The long-run model does not describe the stage of transition and 
therefore does not contain lags of the covariates in levels since all adjustments have come to 
an end in the long term. However, it controls for endogeneity of the right hand side variables 
by inserting leads and lags of the explanatory variables in first differences.
13 As a prerequisite 
the series have to be non-stationary and co-integrated. In our case they are all integrated of 
order one (I(1)) and cointegrated according to Kao’s residual conitegration test (see Tables A2 
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           ( 8 )    
                                                           
12 An example:  In a given year, WFP provides 10% of its disbursements from core resources to Sudan.  Donor A 
contributes USD 50 million to WFP core resources in the same year.  Donor A’s imputed multilateral ODA to 
Sudan through WFP is 0.1*50million = USD 5 million. 
13 It requires the series to be non-stationary and cointegrated in the long-run. Both the panel ADF-unit root test 
and Kao’s cointegration tests supported these premises.   18
In general terms, the model is estimated by restricting the coefficients of the right hand side 
variables to be equal for each aid recipient. This way we get an average measure of the impact 
of different types of aid on bilateral exports.  
 
  In a second step, the model is estimated as an autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) 
model (eq. 9)  (Greene, 2000). This model gives us both short- and long-term coefficients and 
controls for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity and is estimated via panel FGLS.
14  
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Alternatively, the model could be estimated as a partial adjustment model 
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(10)                        
by means of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). We have estimated the model by 
GMM, but report the results only in the Appendix as the model did not pass the test on second 
order autocorrelation in first differences implying that the instruments used become invalid. 
 
4.2. Main results 
4.2.1 Findings for the long run  
                                                           
14 The Granger-causality test which was performed before running the regression based on equation (4) indicated 
exogeneity of the right-hand variables in the short-to medium run. Therefore the explanatory variables were not 
instrumented. The results are available upon request from the authors. 
   19
Table 1 reports the main estimation results that are relevant in the long run. We start by 
reporting the pooled OLS results (column 1). This estimation method indicates quite a high, 
positive impact of bilateral aid on recipient exports (a one dollar increase in bilateral aid 
increases recipient exports by US$ 1.64)
15. However, the results have to be interpreted with 
caution as they disregard heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the error terms and are 
therefore inefficient if both problems occur. Besides that OLS delivers biased and inconsistent 
estimates if right-hand side variables are endogenous. 
Since our data consists of a time span of a maximum of 20 years and a cross-section of 
130 countries, we test for the presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The results 
of the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data and the LR test for heteroskedasticity 
indicate that both problems are present in the data. Given the strong rejection of the null in 
both tests, the model is estimated by means of dynamic feasible generalized least square 
(DFGLS).  
The second column of Table 1 shows the DFGLS results. Individual (country-pair) 
effects (dyadic effects) are assumed to be random and are considered as unobservable 
heterogeneous effects across trading partners. They are assumed not to vary over time. Those 
effects are also a proxy for the so-called “multilateral resistance” factors modelled by 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). We rely on the DFGLS estimates with random effects, 
since they are more efficient than the fixed effect estimates (the within estimates). The 
DFGLS estimations in which we control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the 
error terms remain therefore our estimation method of choice. From now on we will relate to 
the results estimated by DFGLS and depicted in column 2.  
[Table 1 about here] 
With respect to the variable of interest, bilateral aid /bilateral trade relations (LBAID), 
controlling for autocorrelation via DFGLS does change and slightly reduce the positive 
                                                           
15 The monetary impact of bilateral aid is calculated according to the following formula:  
Coefficient BAID= MEAN of X/MEAN of BAID, i.e. 0.134*271000000/22100000 =  US $ 1.64   20
impact of the aid variables on recipients’ export trade (compare column 2 to the OLS results 
in column 1). A one dollar increase in bilateral aid increases recipient exports by US$ 1.50
16. 
This figure - being the average contribution of aid to exports in our 130 countries sample - is 
quite remarkable given the low macroeconomic impact of aid (shown in Table 2).  LBAID 
seems to be a catch-all variable, i.e. all omitted variables that are highly correlated with 
bilateral aid from donor i to recipient j are captured in this variable. Omitted variables (such 
as mutual trust and support, familiarity and goodwill) are sometimes hard to observe and hard 
to quantify. Therefore, we believe that an increase in LBAID goes hand in hand with improved 
bilateral trade relations and it could be argued that an improvement in trade relations pushes 
up exports to the donor countries.  Also, since studies that focus on aid effectiveness from a 
donor’s perspective observe that aid promotes donor exports, what we see here is the 
reciprocal effect so that aid promotes bilateral trade (see Johansson and Pettersson, 2009; 
Martinez-Zarzoso et al., 2010). 
Bilateral aid given by other donors (LBAIDI) also has a positive effect on the exports of a 
specific donor-recipient pair and therefore does not reduce the effect of bilateral aid in a 
specific recipient country. In the same vein as before, it appears that bilateral aid given by 
other donors does not ruin existing bilateral trade relations. In contrast multilateral aid 
(bilaterally computed) given by international organizations (LMAID)  impacts slightly 
negatively on recipient countries exports, but the effect is very small. So overall there is no 
observable crowding out effect from these two alternative sources of aid. This suggests that 
overall recipients’ exports are positively influenced by aid given by other DAC members. One 
could have expected, however, a negative relationship: when other donors give higher 
amounts of aid, the “goodwill” and “habit formation” factors mentioned above could vanish 
and decrease recipients’ exports generating an indirect negative effect on a specific recipient’s 
exports.  
                                                           
16 The monetary impact of bilateral aid is calculated according to the following formula:  
Coefficient BAID= MEAN of X/MEAN of BAID, i.e. 0.122*271000000/22100000 =  US $ 1.50.   21
Most of the other variables present the expected sign and are statistically significant. 
The coefficients of donors’ and recipients’ income are positive and significant and around the 
theoretical value of unity. The coefficient of donors’ income per capita is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level in most specifications, whereas the coefficient of  
recipients’ income per capita is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all 
specifications. The effect of distance is negative as expected. The impact of the bilateral 
nominal exchange rate is not significant. One could have expected a negative sign (implying 
that an increase (appreciation of the recipient country’s currency) reduces recipient countries’ 
exports to the respective donor country). The dummy variables contiguity, common language 
and former colony all have the expected positive sign. The year dummies (not reported in the 
OLS-results of Table 1) are all positive and significant and increasing over the years, thus 
implying a strengthened integration of developing countries into the world trading system in 
the last twenty years.   
As for the transmission channels of aid on the macro-economy, economic theory 
indicated that development aid is associated with two different effects on exports. First, an 
income effect which will lead to an expansion of consumption and investment in the recipient 
country. Eventually productive capacity will also increase in the sector of exportables and the 
additional supply of exportables will be absorbed by the export markets (supply-side effect).
17 
Second, the income effect will also increase the demand for non-tradables thus leading to an 
appreciation of the exchange rate if this is not impeded by a strategic exchange rate 
management of the recipient country’s central bank (demand-side effect).  
In order to scrutinize the importance of macroeconomic transmission channels we 
checked those channels separately. We augmented eq. 5-7 by adding leads and lags of the 
regressors in first differences to control for endogeneity of all right-hand side variables. In 
addition we accounted for autocorrelation of the disturbances by including  AR-terms.  
                                                           
17 The developing country is considered a small country that is unable to influence the price in the world market 
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The results –based on DFGLS estimations- are summarized in Table 2 and a fictitious 
computation of a strong increase in aid has been performed. By means of this computation we 
find evidence that the macroeconomic impact of aid on the recipient country’s economy is 
very small. Assuming that the aid-to-GDP ratio doubles (from 5% to 10%) this would lead to 
a 7% increase in the investment-to GDP ratio (e.g. from 15% to about to 16.05%) and a 15% 
decrease in the domestic savings-to-GDP ratio (e.g. from 10% to 8.5%). The ratio ‘total 
savings-to-GDP”, however, would increase from 10% to 13.5 % (8.5%+5%), taking other 
external savings to be zero. The real exchange rate would increase by 3.5% if the aid-to-GDP    23
ratio increased by 10%.  
[Table 2 about here] 
Taken together, we find a small but significant positive impact on investment and a small but 
significant negative impact on domestic savings and the real exchange rate. This leads us to 
conclude that the effect of bilateral aid on bilateral exports (in Table 1) is not so much due to 
the income effect of aid, i.e. a macroeconomic improvement of  
 the recipient country’s economy, but to a strengthening of bilateral trade relations which goes 
hand in hand with a rise in export-import trade which is driven by  reciprocity.  
 
4.2.2 Findings for the short run and the transition 
Table 3 shows the regression results of the dynamic models (Equation 9) which depict the 
transition (Hassler and Wolters, 2006). It contains the results of the regression formulated as 
an autoregressive distributed lag model ADL (2, 2) which starts out with two lags of the 
dependent and the independent variables. This model is obtained by applying Hendry’s 
general- to-specific method and is estimated by panel FGLS (left-hand side of the table). The 
alternative dynamic model used is a partial adjustment model (with a lagged dependent 
variable) and is estimated by GMM (see Table A4 in the Appendix). The results show that 
autocorrelation was present in GMM, thus causing invalidity of our instruments. 




In the short-to medium run the exchange rate has the expected negative impact on 
recipient countries’ exports, i.e. the appreciation leads to a decline in exports. As to bilateral 
aid, it is often argued that aid ceases to have a positive impact after a certain time has elapsed. 
From the short-to medium run model (Table 3) we can infer that the effect of bilateral aid is   24
indeed non-linear over time and of an inverse u-shape
18. It increases, reaches a maximum 
after one period and then decreases again. The impact of bilateral aid takes up to two years to 
evolve. We observe that current, one- and two-period lagged bilateral aid all contribute to 
current recipients’ exports. The short-to medium run impact of a one dollar rise in aid is 
around US$ 0.25, which is about one sixth of the long-run effect.
19 
 
5. Robustness checks 
Furthermore, we checked the robustness of the results by employing imports from donor 
countries (reported by importers as c.i.f. values) as dependent variable (mirror statistics to 
exports reported by exporters  as f.o.b. values). The regression results basically did not change 
and stayed robust. We controlled for endogeneity of the explanatory variables via  dynamic 
ordinary least squares, which is the approach of Stock and Watson (1993). The Heckman 
approach, which was used to check for sample selection bias, gave inconclusive results 
depending on the selection variables chosen. At times it indicated no sample selection bias 
while in other specifications there clearly was a sample selection bias. This issue has to be 
settled in further research.
20 Helpman et al. (2008) find the selection bias to be economically 
neglible. This finding is corroborated by Johansson and Pettersson (2009). The results of the 
two-step estimation and the OLS estimation are very close together. 
We further tested whether the results were similar across different regions of the 
world. Our hypothesis that Africa would fare worse than Latin America or Asia found support 
in the data. In Table 4 we only report the long-run coefficient of bilateral aid from donor i to 
recipient j and the average impact of this type of bilateral aid on recipient exports. In Africa 
aid’s impact on African exports into donor countries is extremely low. One dollar of aid 
                                                           
18 Non-linear effects of aid with increasing amounts of aid (decreasing returns of aid) were tested in a short-to 
medium term model. These effects were not encountered. The coefficients on the squared aid terms were 
insignificant. 
19 The monetary impact of bilateral aid is calculated according to the following formula:  
Coefficient LBAID= MEAN of X/MEAN of BAID, i.e. 0.02*271000000/22100000 =  US $ 0.245. 
20 Results are available upon request.   25
increases African exports by US$ 0.16, whereas exports increase by US$ 3.22 in Asia and by 
US$ 2.98 in Latin America and the Caribbean for each dollar received as aid. The long-run 
coefficient of bilateral aid for Sub-Saharan Africa was positive, but not significant. It was 
negative but not significant for the Eastern European and Central Asian countries. Our 
estimations (all controlling for endogeneity via FGLS) stand in contrast to the findings of 
Johansson and Pettersson (2009) who observe no big differences of aid effectiveness in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America.  
[Table 4 about here] 
 
6. Conclusions 
The empirical analysis showed that in general development aid has a positive and significant 
impact on recipient countries exports. Aid’s impact on recipient countries’ exports is very 
pronounced  in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, whereas it is hardly noticeable in 
Africa.  
In the successful countries the beneficial effect of aid seems to translate into improved 
trade relations and a small increase in investment. However, the impact of aid on the macro-
economy (especially on investment) is rather small. The Dutch Disease effect of development 
aid, which has been emphasized in theoretical models, is less severe in econometric models 
where elasticities are determined by real data and only present in the short- to medium run. In 
the short-to medium run, the exchange rate seemed to influence recipient countries’ exports in 
the expected way, i.e. an appreciation of the recipient country’s bilateral exchange rate led to 
a decrease in its exports. In the long run, this effect was absent.    26
Overall, it seems that in particular bilateral aid enhances bilateral trade relations and 
thus bilateral trade.  Existing bilateral trade relations appear to be insensitive to aid given by 
other donors or to multilateral aid as no crowding out effects between different types of 
bilateral and multilateral aid could be detected.    27
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Figure 1. Ten largest recipients of net ODA (1988-2007) 
 
Source: OECD; own calculations. 







































































































Source: OECD; own calculations.   32
Figure 3. Net ODA as percentage of recipient countries GDP between 1988 and 2007 on 
average 
 
Source: OECD; own calculations.   33
Table 1. Development aid and recipients’ exports (long-run model)  
   OLS-benchmark 
(inconsistent and 




Squares (DFGLS; eq. 8) 
(2) 
LYD  1.005***          0.995*** 
 (55.742)  (140.756) 
LYR  1.149***          1.196*** 
 (85.014)  (169.071) 
LYHD  -1.456***         -1.199*** 
 (-12.886)  (-31.238) 
LYHR  0.298***          0.282*** 
 (10.719)  (18.616) 
LDIST  -0.612***         -0.622*** 
 (-26.631)  (-40.565) 
LBAID  0.134***          0.122*** 
 (15.290)  (28.721) 
LBAIDI  0.075***          0.033*** 
 (3.894)  (2.821) 
LMAID  0         -0.001**  
 (-0.721)  (-2.08) 
LXCHR 0.068***  0.005 
 (3.695)  (0.379) 
CONTIG  0.506*          2.302*** 
 (1.654)  (7.113) 
COMLANG  0.863***          1.087*** 
 (14.302)  (45.157) 
COLONY  0.896***          0.791*** 
 (12.675)  (17.19) 
_cons  -22.762***        -25.651*** 
 (-18.182)  (-50.905) 
  dyadic effects (yes)  dyadic effects (yes) 
  year dummies (yes)  leads and lags (yes) 
R-squared  0.607                   
N 18779  12391 
Ll -40540.84   
Rmse 2,097,515   
Note: t-values in parentheses. Year dummies are not reported in OLS. Leads and lags are not 
reported in DFGLS. 
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Table 2       Macroeconomic transmission channels (the long-run view) 
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1.93 1.85 2.18 
Note: t-values in parentheses. DFGLS estimation is basically a DOLS estimation in which we correct for 
autocorrelation. All variables are in logarithms.  INY=investment-to-GDP ratio; DSY=domestic savings-to-GDP 
ratio; XCHR=real exchange rate (increase stands for depreciation; XCHR=100 in the year 2000); EXTNSY=net 
external savings (minus ODA)-to-GDP ratio; AIDY=net ODA-to-GDP ratio. AR(1)=first order autocorrelation 
of the disturbances.  
We have tested for the macroeconomic transmission channels controlling for endogeneity and autocorrelation. 
For this purpose, we have applied a fixed effects Dynamic Feasible Generalized Least Squares (DFGLS) 
estimation
21, adding leads and lags of the explanatory variables in first differences to equations 5 to 7. 
                                                           
21 Wooldridge (2009) explains how strictly exogenous explanatory variables are generated by inserting leads and 
lags of the first-differenced variables.   35
Table 3. Development aid and recipients’ exports in the short-to-medium run  
   Short to Medium Run ADL(2,2)-Model (FGLS); eq. 9 
              Without time dummies  With time dummies 
LX (-1)              0.610***       0.622*** 
              (391.562)  (161.352) 
LX (-2)              0.286***       0.282*** 
              (99.439)  (76.243) 
LYD                0.640***       0.087*** 
              (25.769)  (21.719) 
LYD (-1)             -0.379***  --- 
              (-11.910)  --- 
LYD (-2)            -0.164***  --- 
              (-8.086)  --- 
LYR                0.225***       0.197*** 
              (10.255)  (8.989) 
LYR (-1)             -0.122***      -0.101*** 
              (-5.567)  (-4.659) 
LYHD               0.767***       0.330*** 
              (11.181)  (4.798) 
LYHD (-1)            -1.074***  --- 
              (-11.182)  ---         
LYHD (-2)            0.149*        -0.493*** 
              (1.923)  (-7.321) 
LYHR               0.588***       0.410*** 
              (9.300)  (10.319) 
LYHR (-1)            -0.151*    --- 
              (-1.814)  --- 
LYHR (-2)          -0.397***      -0.382*** 
              (-7.611)  (-9.676) 
LDIST      -0.070***      -0.072*** 
 (-15.175)  (-14.966) 
LBAID              0.006***       0.008*** 
              (2.922)  (3.557) 
LBAID (-1)            0.008***       0.009*** 
              (3.419)  (3.754) 
LBAID (-2)          0.006***  0.002 
              (2.58)  (0.973) 
LBAIDI            -0.012**   -0.009 
              (-2.438)  (-1.583) 
LBAIDI (-2)         0.036***       0.029*** 
              (7.467)  (5.341) 
LXCHR             -0.025**       -0.030**  
              (-1.984)  (-2.546) 
LXCHR (-1)            0.056***       0.096***   36
              (3.199)  (5.394) 
LXCHR  (-2)        -0.035***      -0.043*** 
              (-3.646)  (-4.441) 
COMLANG            0.067***       0.068*** 
              (6.235)  (6.150) 
COLONY             0.076***       0.065*** 
              (6.468)  (4.986) 
_cons             -1.876***      -1.517*** 
              (-10.758)  (-7.798) 
N             13685  13685 
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Table 4. Different impact of bilateral aid in different regions of the world 
 Developing 
countries 
Africa  Asia  Latin America   
& Caribbean 
Coefficient ( LBAID)  0.122*** 0.03***  0.139*** 0.274*** 
        
Mean of exports 
( X ) in millions of 
US$ 
271 114  874  135 
        
Mean of bilateral 
aid ( D I A B ) in 
millions of US$ 
22.1 21.9  37.7  12.4 
        
Impact of aid in 
terms of US$ 
(rounded) 
US$ 1.50  US$ 0.16  US$ 3.22  US$ 2.98 
Note: The impact of aid was calculated as:  LBAID* X / D I A B . Exports and aid are in current US$.   38
APPENDIX 
 
Figure a. Net ODA disbursements by income group of recipient country. 1988-2007 
 
Source: OECD   39
Table A1. Summary statistics 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
BAID 35003 2.21E+07  1.22E+08 -1.77E+07  1.12E+10 
BAIDI 35003 3.85E+08  8.27E+08 -9520000 2.18E+10 
MAID 46508 4.94E+09  1.43E+10 -5.53E+10  8.17E+11 
X 26615 2.71E+08  1.83E+09 1  1.02E+11 
M 36843 2.62E+08  1.98E+09 1 1.28E+11 
        
XCHR 47250 118.9089  117.8249 0.0129694 2939.103 
YD 51660 1.13E+12  2.05E+12 3.67E+10  1.38E+13 
YR 49791 4.82E+10  1.66E+11 2.84E+07  3.38E+12 
YHD 51660 24404.99  7330.851 9279.041 53432.5 
YHR 47628 4738.044  7054.332 111.5047  64512.3 
        
DIST 51660 7759.54  3791.68 270.6798  18953.23 
        
LBAID 34921 14.49717  2.491744 9.21034  23.14166 
LBAIDI 34983 5.083094  1.444329 -4.605338  9.991882 
LMAID 46508 4.941066  14.30616 -55.34  816.63 
LX 26615 15.54073  3.500141 0  25.34885 
LM 36843 15.46038  3.423805 0  25.57454 
        
LXCHR 49476 4.683498  1.122653 -4.345165  14.98787 
LYD 51660 26.79275  1.315216 24.32498  30.25216 
LYR 49791 22.65125  1.973622 17.16239  28.84957 
LYHD 51660 10.05753  0.3025221 9.135513 10.88617 
LYHR 47628 7.812596  1.125598 4.714067 11.07461 
        




Table A2. Results from panel unit root tests 
Variable ADF-Fisher  Chi-square  test 
statistics 
P-value 
LX 1348.87***  1.00 
LYD 1368.53***  1.00 
LYR 1061.61***  1.00 
LYHD 1008.35***  1.00 
LYHR 1109.81***  1.00 
LXCHR 4089.67***  1.00 
LBAID 2843.95**  0.95 
LBAIDI 2041.31***  1.00 
LMAID 2265.71***  1.00 
Note: Null hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process);  
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Table A3. Results from Kao’s panel cointegration test  
 
 
Series in cointegration relationship: LX LD LR LHD LHR LXCHR LBAID LBAIDI 
LMAID 
 t-statistic  P-value 
DF -27.90  0.00 
DF* -10.68  0.00 
Note: Null hypothesis: No cointegration; trend assumption: No deterministic trend; automatic lag length 
selection based on SIC with a max lag of 0. 
 
 
Table A4.  Results from the partial adjustment model 
               
Partial Adjustment Model (GMM)    
   b/t 
LX (-1)               0.542*** 
                (8.042) 
LYD                 0.429*** 
                (4.837) 
LYR                 0.514*** 
                (6.664) 
LYHD               -0.468*   
                (-1.882) 
LYHR                0.087*   
                (1.712) 
LDIST              -0.282*** 
                (-5.251) 
LBAID               0.059    
                (1.044) 
LBAIDI              0.018    
                    (0.545)    
LMAID              -0.000    
                   (-0.484)   
LXCHR               0.028    
                (1.406) 
CONTIG              0.206    
                    (0.690)    
COMLANG             0.351*** 
                (3.540) 
COLONY              0.399*** 
(2.803)   41
 
                 
_cons             -10.806*** 
                -3.004 
R-squared                    
N               16754 
 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -8.63  Pr > z =  0.000
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   3.87  Pr > z =  0.000
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(140)  = 263.29  Prob > chi2 =  0.000. (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
   
 
Table A5: List of countries 
List of recipients 
(j)  130      
List of 
Donors (i)  21
Afghanistan 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. Jamaica  Peru  Australia     
Albania  Congo, Rep.  Jordan  Philippines  Austria    
Algeria  Costa Rica  Kazakstan  Qatar  Belgium    
Angola  Cote d'Ivoire  Kenya  Rwanda  Canada    
Argentina Croatia  Kiribati  Samoa Denmark     
Armenia Cuba Korea  Saudi Arabia  Finland    
Aruba Djibouti  Kuwait  Senegal  France     
Azerbaijan Dominica 
Laos Dem. 
Rep. Seychelles  Germany     
Bahamas 
Dominican 
Republic  Lebanon  Sierra Leone  Greece    
Bahrain Ecuador  Lesotho  Somalia  Ireland     
Bangladesh Egypt  Liberia  South Africa  Italy    
Barbados  El Salvador  Libya  Sri Lanka  Japan    
Belarus Eritrea  Madagascar  Sudan  Netherlands     
Belize   Malawi  Suriname 
New 
Zealand    
Benin Ethiopia  Malaysia  Swaziland  Norway     
Bermuda Fiji  Mali  Syria  Portugal     
Bhutan Gabon  Mauritania  Taiwan  Spain     
Bolivia Gambia  Mauritius  Tanzania  Sweden     
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Georgia  Mexico  Thailand Switzerland     
Botswana Ghana Moldova  Timor-Leste 
United 
States    
Brazil Grenada  Mongolia  Togo 
United 
Kingdom    
Brunei  Guatemala  Morocco  Tonga         42
Burkina Faso  Guinea  Mozambique
Trinidad and 
Tobago       
Burundi  Guinea-Bissau  Myanmar  Tunisia       
Cambodia  Guyana  Namibia  Turkey       
Cameroon  Haiti  Nepal  Uganda       
Cape Verde  Honduras  Nicaragua 
United Arab 
Emirates       
Central African 
Republic    Niger  Uruguay       
Chad  India  Nigeria  Venezuela       
Chile  Indonesia  Oman  Vietnam       
China  Iran  Pakistan  Yemen       
Colombia  Iraq  Panama  Zambia       
Comoros  Israel  Paraguay  Zimbabwe       
 